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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RAY KEITH SUDBURY, and 
RUTH JEAN SUDBURY, 
Plaintiffs and AppelZants, 
vs. 
OLAF THEODORE Case No. 9220 
STEVENSEN, JR., and 
BARBARA ANN 
STEVENSEN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On J~anuary 28, 1960, a summary judgment 
was entered in favor of defendants .. Plaintiffs ap-
peal from that judgment. 
Prior to June, 1958, plaintiffs and defendants 
were engaged in the business of conducting Ollies 
Terrace Room in Salt Lake City, Utah, as a limited 
partnership. Keith Sudbury and Olaf Theodore Stev-
ensen, Jr., (hereinafter called Ted Stevensen) were 
general partners and each owned a forty per cent 
interest in and to the assets of said partnership. 
Ruth Jean Sudbury and Barbara Ann Stevensen 
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each owned a ten per cent interest in the assets of 
said partnership. (Exhibit P-8, R. 34) 
In the month of June, 1958, the parties en-
tered into and executed the agreement of sale, a 
copy of which is marked Exhibit "A" and attached 
to plaintiffs' complaint. The agreement provides 
for the purchase by defendants of the undivided 
one-half interest in and to the partnership assets 
owned by plaintiffs for the total sum of $36,200.00~ 
(R. 5) The downpayment of $10,791.59 was paid 
by defen·dants assuming and paying the sum of 
$4,591.59 that represented plaintiffs' sh'are of the 
then existing obligations of the partnership, the 
cancellation by defendants of the sum of $·2,500.00 
owed by plaintiffs to defendants and by the pay-
ment of the sum of $3,700.00 in cash. (R. 6) The 
balance of $25,408.41 under the terms of said agree-
ment was to be paid in weekly installments of 
$100.00, the first installment of which became due 
on September 1, 1958. Under the terms of the agree-
ment defendants were granted a grace period of 
fifteen weeks. Defendants used the entire grace 
period before making any of the installment pay-
ments. 
The first weekly installment that became due 
after the expiration of the fifteen week grace period 
was on December 15, 1958. On December 8, 1958, 
defendants paid plaintiffs the sum of $300.00 (Ex-
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hi bit P-3) This payment represented three weekly 
installments. Thereafter defendants paid the weekly 
installments down to and including the installment 
th·at became due on July 27, 1959. 
On August 10, 1959, defendants delivered a 
check to plaintiffs in the amount of $'200.00. This 
check represented the payment that became due on 
August 3rd and the payment that became due on 
August 10, 1959. At the same time defendants de-
livered to plaintiffs a series of checks that were 
post dated one week apart beginning with August 
17, 1959. That after August 10, 1959, and prior 
to August 17, 19'59, plaintffs presented said $200.00 
check (Exhibit P-1) to the First Sectlrity Bank of 
Utah, N.A., Main at First South Branch, and the 
same was wrongfully dishonored by said bank and 
was marked "refer to maker". On Monday, August 
17, 1959, plaintiff, Keith Sudbury, presented the 
August 10, 1959, check (Exhibit P-1) in the amount 
of $200.00 and the August 17, 1959, check (Exhibit 
P-2) in the amount of $100.00 for payment. The 
bank on that day wrongfully refused to honor the 
checks. 
On the same day the bank dishonored both of 
said checks, Keith Sudbury consulted Mr. George 
Bridwell, one of the attorneys for plaintiffs, rela-
tive to his rights under said agreement. The letter 
dated August 17, 1959, (Exhibit P-4) was written 
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on the date it bears and was delivered by Keith 
Sudbury to one of Ted Stevensen's employees some-
time within the next week. Defendants were in 
Europe on a vacation at the time Exhibit P-4 was 
delivered. The defendants returned from Europe 
immediately after Exhibit P-4 was delivered, and 
on September 1, 1959, defendants made a tender 
to pllaintiffs of all installments that were due under 
the agreement of sale as of that day. Plaintiffs re-
fused to accept the tender of said weekly install-
ments and returned the $500.00 so tendered to de-
fendant's attorney on September 11, 195'9, together 
with a letter (Exhibit P-5) from Mr. Reynolds, 
one of plaintiffs' attorneys. 
Plaintiffs' complaint was filed on November 
10, 1959, seeking a forfeiture of not only the one-
half interest in the property purchased by defen-
dants from plaintiffs but also the one-half interest 
in said property that defendants owned in their 
own right prior to S'aid agreement of sale. 
On January 18, 1960, defendants paid the sum 
of $2,500.00 in the form of a cashier's check to the 
clerk of the court with instructions to deliver the 
same to plaintiffs or their attorney upon request. 
This $·2,500.00 represented all weekly installments 
that were then due under the agreement. On Jan-
uary 20, 1960, at the time of the argument of the 
motions for summary judgment, defend·ants through 
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their attorney and in open court again tendered 
to plaintiffs said $2,500.00. ( R. 25) Plaintiffs re-
fused to accept s·aid tender. 
The foregoing statement of fact is undisputed. 
Plaintiffs claim in their brief that defendants were 
eighteen weeks delinquent in the payment of the 
weekly installments as of August 17, '1959, when 
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., dishonored the 
checks of August 10 and August t7, 19'59. This 
statement is not correct because it ignores, as is 
readily apparent from reading plaintiffs' brief, the 
fact that defendants were granted a fifteen week 
grace period. When the bank wrongfully dishonored 
defendants' two checks on August 17th, defendants 
were delinquent only three payments; namely, the 
August 3, August 10 and August 1'7, 19'59, pay-
ments. No matter which way it is stated, all p~arties 
agree that had the bank honored the checks on Aug-
ust 17, 1959, as it should have done, defendants 
would not have been in default under the agreement 
in question. 
STATEMENT OF P·OINTS 
P·OINT I 
THE "AGREElVIENT OF SALE" TIHAT IS THE 
SUBJECT OF THIS ACTION IS IN LEGAL EFFECT A 
CHATTEL M·ORTGAGE AND NOT A CONDITIONAL 
SALES CONTRACT. 
POINT II 
THE OPTION TO ACCELERATE PAYMENTS AND 
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MAKE ENTIRE DEBT DUE WAS NOT EXERCISED 
BY PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS ARE NOT IN 
DEFAULT UNDER THE AGREEMENT. 
P·OINT III 
FORECIJOSURE IS PLAINTIFFS' EXCLUSIVE 
REMEDY UNDER THE AGREEMENT IN QUEST}ON. 
POINT IV 
ANS'WER TO PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF. 
ARGUMENT 
P·OINT I 
THE "AGREEMENT OF SALE" THAT IS THE 
SUBJECT OF THIS ACTION IS IN LEGAL EFFECT A 
c·HATTEL MORTGAGE AND NOT A CONDITIONAL 
SALES CONTRACT. 
All parties agree that the agreement in ques-
tion was one of sale and was not an agreement to 
sell. Title to plaintiffs' one-half interest in the pro-
perty sold passed to defendants at the time of the 
execution of the agreement. (R. 4, par. II, plain-
tiffs' brief p. 16) Immediately following the execu-
tion of the agreement of sale, defendants owned the 
entire legal title to all of the property described in 
the agreement. 
The first question the trial court was faced 
with in this case was to determine whether the 
agreement in question was in legal effect a '·'chattel 
mortgage" or a "conditional sales contract". 
In answering this question there are certain 
basic rules that must be kept in mind. 
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INTENTION OF THE PARTIES 
1. "'VTv'"hether a particular transaction is a con-
ditional sale or a chattel mortgage, in the final an-
alysis, depends on the intention of the parties, which 
is to be ascertained from their conduct, the atten-
dant circumstances, and the terms of the agreement. 
The above rule is announced in the annotation en-
titled, "What amounts to conditional sale" in 175 
A.L.R. 1366 at p·age 1378. 
IF DOUBTFUL, MORTGAGE PREFERRED 
2. Where it is doubtful from the face of an 
instrument whether the contract is a conditional 
sale or mortgage, the courts generally treat it as a 
mortgage, for the reason that such construction is 
most apt to attain the ends of justice and prevent 
fraud and oppression. The cases cited in 175 A.L.R. 
1366 announce and demonstrate this rule. To the 
same effect see Kliks v. Courtemanche, 150 Ore. 332, 
4·3 P. 2d 913; Great American Indemnity Comp~any 
v. Utility Contractors, 21 Tenn. App. 46'3, 111 S.W. 
2d 901; 9'2 A.L.R. 311. Consistent with this gen-
eral attitude of the courts is the attitude of the Utah 
Supreme Court as declared in the case of Green v. 
Pallfreyman, 109 U. 291, 166 P. 2d 215, where 
it said, 
"Forfeitures are not favored, and in in-
terpreting an agreement, every reasonable 
presumption should be indulged against an 
intention to allow a forfeiture." 
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To the same effect see Peterson v. !-lodges, 121 
U. 7·2, 239 P. 2d 180. 
PASSING OF TITLE 
3. Did title pass under terms of the agree-
ment at the time of its execution or was title re-
tained by the plaintiffs, as security for the payment 
of the purchase price? Did the agreement in ques-
tion constitute a sale or is it a "contract to sell"? 
Our court in Middleton v. Evans, 86 U. 3'96, 45 P. 
'2d 570, points up the difference by using the follow-
ing language, 
"In a contract to sell, the parties agree 
to transfer property and goods ,at some fu-
ture time, whereas in a sale, th~ parties agree 
to transfer property presently~~' -
a. The annotation in 175 A.L.R. at page 1380 
states, 
"That a simple retention of title to the 
chattel sold, in the seller, usually evidences a 
conditional sale, in the absence of provisions 
more consistent with a mortgage." 
This ·annotation also demonstrates quite clearly 
that if title is not retained by the seller and if it is 
apparent from the instrument involved that the in-
tention was to pass title that then the effect of the 
transaction is th·at it is a chattel mortgage and not 
a condition~al s.ale. 
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CANNOT BE BOTH A CHATTEL MORTGAGE 
AND A CONDITIONAL SALES CONTRACT 
4. The agreement cannot be both a chattel 
mortgage and a conditional sales contract. 
a. The court in Ferkins v. Skates, 220 
Ala. 216, 124 S. 514, announces the rule that the 
relationship of conditional vendor and vendee, and 
o'f mortgagee and mortgagor, cannot subsist as to 
the same property at the same time. The state of 
the title and the incidence of the transaction are 
widely different. 
A condition·al sales contract by definition is 
one where title is retained by the seller until the 
purchase price is paid or until the happening of 
some other specified event. An examination of the 
agreement involved in this case adequately demon-
strates an·d all of the parties to this lawsuit agree 
that the plaintiffs did not retain title to their one-
half interest in the property, but on the contrary it 
was the intention of the parties that title pass at 
the time of the execution of the agreement. That 
fact in and of itself would probably prevent the 
agreement in question from having the legal effect 
of a condition·al sales contract. 
Paragraph V of the agreement (R. 7) provides 
that defendants will give plaintiffs a chattel mort-
gage on not only the one-half interest in the property 
that defendants were purchasing but also on the 
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one-half interest in the property th·at defend'ants 
already owned prior to the agreement. The strict 
foreclosure provision of the agreement contained 
in Paragraph VI, (A) provides that in the event 
of default that plaintiffs would be permitted to sell 
not only the property they l1ad sold to defendants 
but also defendants' one-h·alf interest that they al-
ready owned, and that plaintiffs would be entitled 
to retain all of the proceeds from that sale. The 
forfeiture provision contained in Paragraph VI, (B) 
provides that in the event of default the buyers will 
not only forfeit their interest in the one-half interest 
purchase from plaintiffs but that the buyers will 
also forfeit their one-half interest in the property 
that they already owned prior to the agreement. 
The agreement clearly contemplates that plain-
tiffs will acquire a security interest in not only the 
one-half interest in the property that they sold to 
defendants but that they will also get a security 
interest in the one-half interest in the property that 
was owned by the defendants. By the terms of the 
agreement title to plaintiffs' interest in the property 
passed immediately to the defendants. Plaintiffs 
never did have title to the one-half interest that was 
owned by defendants, so the only way that plaintiffs 
could possibly get a security interest in the one-half 
interest owned by the defendants prior to the execu-
tion of the agreement would be for the defendants 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to give the plaintiffs a chattel mortgage on such in-
terest. Since title to the one-half interest sold passed 
at the time of the execution of the agreement, the 
only way the plaintiffs could acquire a security in-
terest in the property sold was for defendants to 
give plaintiffs a chattel mortgage back. It would 
be inconsistent to hold that plaintiffs had a chattel 
mortgage on the one-half interest belonging to de-
fendants originally and had a conditional sales con-
tract on the one-half interest that they sold to de-
fendants. Defendants never did execute and deliver 
a chattel mortgage as called for by the agreement; 
however, an agreement to execute a mortgage in 
equity is deemed a mortgage as between the parties. 
The agreement is inconsistent. Paragraph V 
of the agreement provides that defendants will give 
plaintiffs a chattel mortgage on all of the property 
that constitutes Ollies Terrace Room. Paragraph VI, 
(A) provides that in the event of default the chattel 
mortgage may be foreclosed and all of the property 
(which would include defendants one-half interest) 
can be sold and all of the money realized therefrom 
retained by plaintiffs. This in effect is a provision 
for a strict foreclosure of the chattel mortgage. 
Paragraph VI, (B) provides that in the event of a 
default defendants will forfeit not only all of their 
interest in the property they purchased from plain-
tiffs but also all of their interest in the property 
11 
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they owned prior to the agreement in question. This 
provision is a forfeiture provision and is one that 
is common to a conditional sales contract. As we 
have already seen an instrument in legal effect 
cannot be both a chattel mortgage and a conditional 
sales contract. It must be one or the other. In the 
event of a default, the methods of enforcing a chattel 
mortgage are entirely different than the methods of 
enforcing a conditional sales contract. 
Construing the agreement as a mortgage in-
stead of a conditional sale will do justice to the par-
ties. Defendants will be required to pay the balance 
due under the agreement. Plaintiffs will get their 
money and defendants will retain their business. 
The trial court in finding of fact No. 5 ( R. 35) 
and in its conclusion of law (R. 36) and in its 
judgment (R. 3'7) foun·d as a fact that it was the 
intention of the parties that the agreement in ques-
tion have the effect of a chattel mortgage, and the 
court held that it in legal effect was a chattel mort-
gage. ·we think the court was clearly right in so 
holding. 
POINT II 
THE OPTION TO ACCELERATE PAYMENTS AND 
MAKE ENTIRE DEBT DUE WAS NOT EXERCISED 
BY PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS ARE N'OT IN 
DEFAULT UNDER THE AGREEMENT. 
The trial court has found :and properly so that 
the agreement in legal effect is a chattel mortgage. 
1q 
L . .:... 
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That being so the question then arises was the option 
to accelerate the payments and make the entire debt 
due exercised? In determining the answer to this 
question certain things should be kept in mind. 
OPTIONAL OR AUTOMATIC ACCELE'RATION 
1. Paragrph VI (A) of the agreement pro-
vides that in the event of default the "Sellers may, 
at their option, declare the whole of the unpaid bal-
ance under this agreement at once due and pay-
able" * * *. It should be noted that this provision 
gives the seller an option to accelerate the payments 
in the event of default. It does not provide that in 
the event of default the p-ayments are automatically 
accelerated without any act on the part of the sellers. 
10 C.J.S. Sec. 251 (c), page 749, states the 
rule as follows, 
"An acceleration clause may be absolute 
or optional in form. If absolute, maturity oc-
curs on the happening of the specified de-
fault; if optional, maturity does not occur 
until the exercise of the option." 
To the same effect see the annotation in 159 
A.L.R., 1077 entitled Acceleration of Note or Mort-
gage as Automatic or Optional, where the rule is 
stated at page 1091, as follows: 
"It has been uniformly held that a pro-
vision in a note or mortgage accelerating the 
maturity for non-payment of interest or in-
stallments, or other default, at the option of 
13 
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the holder or the mortgagee, is not self ex-
ecuting but requires some action on the part 
of the holder or mortgagee without which the 
amount will not become due." 
AFFIRMATIVE DECLARATION NECESSARY 
2. What is essential to the proper exercise of 
an option to accelerate maturity? 
a. The general rule is stated in 5 A.L.R. 
2d 968, 
"That a provision in a bill or note acceler-
ating the maturity thereof on nonpayment of 
interest or installments, or other default at 
the option of the holder, requires some affir-
mative action on the part of the holder, evi-
dencing his election to take advantage of the 
accelerating provision, and that until such 
action has been taken the provision has no 
operation. In other words, some positive ac-
tion on the part of the holder is an essential 
condition for the exercise of his option and a 
mere mental intention to declare the full 
amount due is not sufficient." 
b. As demonstrated by the annotation in 
5 A.L.R. 2d 968, it is uniformly held that it is es-
sential for a valid exercise of an option to accelerate 
the maturity of a bill or note or an installment under 
a contract that the holder or payee or the seller do 
some positive act to indicate the exercise of the 
option. 
DECLARATION NOT SUFFICIENT TO ACCEL-
ERATE UNLESS FOLLOWED BY AFFIRMA-
14 
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TIVE ACT TOWARD ENFORCING DECLARED 
INTENTION. 
3. The next question is, what constitutes a 
positive act on the part of a person who is exercis-
ing the option to accelerate? 
a. On page 9'72 of 5 A.L.R. 2d the gen-
eral rule is stated, 
"While it is impossible to formulate a 
hard and fast rule by which each act can be 
immediately classified in regard to its suffi-
ciency, the test seems to be the definiteness 
and finality of the holders action as expres-
sion of his election. Stated generally, the rule 
is that the exercise of the option must be 
made in a manner so clear and unequivocal 
as to leave no doubt as to the holders inten-
tion and to apprise the maker effectively of 
the fact that the option has been exercised." 
(See to the same effect Union Central Life 
Insurance Company v. A,dams, 169 Okla. 57'2, 
38 P. 2d 76.) 
b. In 36 Am. Jur., Sec. 393, p. 884 the 
rule is stated as follows: 
"The general rule is that where the ac-
celeration of the maturity of a mortgage debt 
on default is made optional with the mortga-
gee, some affirmative action must be taken 
by him evidencing his election to take advan-
tage of the accelerating provision, and that 
until sucl1 action has been taken, the provi-
sion has no operation. (See cases cited under 
Note 1'8, page 884 of 36 Am. Jur.) The ex-
ercise of the option should be made in a man-
15 
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ner clear and unequivocal, so as to leave no 
doubt as to the mortgagees intention* * *even 
a declaration may be a sufficient exercise of 
the option, but to be effective, the declaration 
must be followed by an affirmative act to-
ward enforcing the declared intention." 
A mere declaration of intention to accelerate 
is not sufficient but to be effective 'as stated by the 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Union Central Life 
Insurance Company v. Adams, 169 Okl. 572, 38 P. 
2d 26, 
"The declaration must be followed by an 
affirmative act towards enforcing the de-
clared intention." 
WHO MAY EXERCISE OPTION 
4. Who may elect to exercise the option to ac-
celerate the p'ayments? 
a. In 59 C.J.S., Sec. 495 (5) (d) the 
rule is stated, 
"The terms of the deed of trust or mort-
gage control as to the person who may elect 
to accelerate the maturity of the debt secured 
* * * joint owners of a mortgage must join 
in an election. (See Seligman v. Berg, 251 
N.Y. Supp. 689; B.each v. Tangier Hotel Com-
pany, 179 N.Y. Supp. 657.) 
In 10 C.J.S., Sec. 251 (d) p. 750, the rule is 
stated, 
"WHO MAY EXERCISE 0 P T I 0 N. 
* * * Where under the provisions of the in-
strument, only the holders of the note can 
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declare the entire indebtedness mature, if 
there are more than one holder a unanimous 
exercise of the option is required, and any-
thing short of th·at is ineffective." 
TENDER BEFORE OPTION EFFECTIVELY 
EXERCISED. 
5. What is the effect of a tender of the sum 
as to which there has been a default if the tender 
is made before the option to accelerate is exercised? 
The law is to the effect that a tender of the 
sum as to which there has been a default, if made 
before the option to accelerate is exercised, bars ac-
celeration of the maturity of the debt secured by the 
mortgage. In 59 C.J.S., Sec. 495 (6) (b) the rule 
is stated. 
"A tender of the sum as to which there 
has been a default, if made before election 
to accelerate, bars acceleration of the matur-
ity of the debt secured by the mortgage or 
deed of trust." 
Our Utah Court in the case of Home Owners 
Loan Corporation v. Washington, 180 U. 469, 161 
P. ·2d 355 (1945) adopts the rule stated above and 
in so doing says, 
"The law relative to tender under con-
tracts, which provide that in case of default 
the holder has the option to declare the whole 
amount due, is well set forth in 52 Am. Jur. 
page 24·5, Section 41, which is as follows: 
'Under a contract which provides that any de-
17 
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fault in the payment of the interest or an in-
stallment of the principal when due shall give 
the obligee an option to declare the whole 
amount due, the general rule is that a tender 
of payment of the overdue principal or inter-
est before the option to declare the whole debt 
due has been exercised cuts off the right to 
exercise the option. Stansbury v. Embr~ey, 128 
Tenn. 103, 158 S.W. 991, 47 LRA., N.S. 980; 
W.einberg v. Naher, 51 Wash. 591, 99 P. 736. 
This is so because the debt does not become 
due on the mere default in payment, but by 
affirmative action by which the creditor makes 
it known to the debtor that he intends to de-
clare the whole debt due." 
The Supreme Court of Idaho in the case of Clark 
v. Paddock, 24 Ida. 142, 132 P. 795, h·as adopted 
the same rule as the Supreme Court of Utah. 
In applying the foregoing principles of law to 
the case now before this court, it is readily apparent 
that the agreement in question gives plaintiffs an 
option to accelerate the payments. By the clear terms 
of Paragraph V (A) the right to accelerate is an op-
tional one and is not an automatic or a self-execut-
ing one. In determining whether or not plaintiffs 
effectively exercised the option to accelerate the pay-
ments, we should look at the first act claimed by 
plaintiffs to constitute such acceleration. That was 
the letter of August 17, 1959, Exhibit P-4, from 
Keith Sudbury to Ted Stevensen. That letter reads 
verbatim as follows: 
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"Dear Ted: 
"Because of First Security Bank's failure 
to honor your checks to me, dated August 10th 
and 17th, I am electing to accelerate the money 
you owe me under our agreement. 
"There is due me the sum of $23,506.51, 
which I will expect paid to me within a short 
time after you return from Europe so that 
it will not be necessary for me to foreclose 
your equipment or take over the business. 
"I am enclosing both of these dishonored 
checks to you and I will accept no further 
sums less than the full amount due me. For 
that reason, I am also en-closing checks dated 
August 24th, August 31st, September 7th, 
September 14th, and September 21st, each in 
the amount of $100.00. 
It should be noted from the letter first of all 
that it is not an unequivocal statement that Sudbury 
elects to accelerate the payments and intends to go 
ahead with the mortgage foreclosure. The first para-
graph states he elects to accelerate, but the second 
paragraph then says that he may foreclose on the 
equipment or he may take over the business .. Fore-
closure of the chattel mortgage is completely incon-
sistent and completely different than treating the 
agreement as a conditional sale and attempting to 
enforce the forfeiture provision by taking over the 
business as such. To effectively exercise the option 
the courts all hold that it must be made in a manner 
so clear and unequivocal as to leave no doubt as to 
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the holders intention and to apprise the defendants 
effectively of the fact that the option has been exer-
cised, and in addition to that there must be an af-
firmative act tovvard enforcing the declared inten-
tion. And as stated in 36 Am. Jur., Sec. 393, p. 884, 
"Even a declaration may be a sufficient 
exercise of the option, but to be effective, the 
declaration must be followed by an affirma-
tive act toward enforcing the declared inten-
tion." 
In this case there has been no affirmative act 
by plaintiffs toward enforcing the mortgage by a 
foreclosure proceeding. On the contrary plaintiffs 
affirmative action has been completely inconsistent 
with a foreclosure of the mortgage. Plaintiffs in-
stead of attempting to foreclose have sought all the 
way to enforce the forfeiture provisions of the agree-
ment and have attempted to take over the business 
lock, stock and barrel. The absolute and clear cut 
evidence of this fact is contained in the letter from 
Mr. Reynolds, one of the attorneys for plaintiffs, 
Exhibit P-5, wherein it states, 
"The Sudburys have elected to pursue 
their remedies under the terms of the agree-
ment of June, 1958, based upon the default 
of your client, Olaf Theodore Stevenson, Jr., 
in failing to make the payments required of 
him pursuant to said agreement, and that 
the Sudburys have elected to declare a for-
feiture of Mr. Stevenson's right, title and 
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interest in as subject matter of said agree-
ment pursuant to paragraph VI B thereof; 
accordingly, demand is hereby made upon you 
as attorney for Stevenson for the immediate 
delivery of possession to Sudburys of the pre-
mises, property goods, chattels and properties 
of every kind and character which may be the 
subject matter of the agreement of June, 1958, 
and for the execution of appropriate instru-
ments of conveyance and transfer of titles 
to Sudbury. 
"Sp~ecifioally, you ar.e advis,e,d that Sud-
burys elect hereby not to enforce the remedy 
of foreclos~tre ,and .do elect to purs-ue their 
rightful ,alter%ative, namely forfeiture as set 
forth in the afores,aid agreement. 
"In addition, Sudburys hereby demand 
an accounting on the part of your client of all 
receipts and disbursements, a balance sheet 
and a profit and loss statement applicable 
to the operation of the business heretofore 
conducted under the name and style, "Ollies 
Terrace Room" which business is the subject 
matter of the agreement of June 1958, from 
the date of this letter over the period to the 
date of delivery of possession to Sudburys as 
aforesaid. 
"Also, you are hereby notified that Sud-
burys intend to pursue their legal remedies as 
against Stevenson for any unlawful detainer 
on the part of Mr. Stevenson, which may be 
appropriately ·determined. 
"Finally, you are hereby advised that 
notwithstanding the foregoing Sudburys are 
willing to accord Stevenson the right to pay 
in full the current remaining balance of prin-
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cipal and interest due on said contract within 
30 days from date hereof as an additional 
right not provided in said agreement." 
Acceleration of all of the unpaid installments 
is only necessary in the event plaintiffs elected to 
foreclose the chattel mortgage. Acceleration of the 
payments would be a necessary condition precedent 
to a foreclosure action, while acceleration of the 
payments would not be a condition precedent to en-
forcing a forfeiture. Because plaintiffs, acting 
through their attorney, specifically stated that they 
elected not to enforce the remedy of foreclosure but 
did elect to pursue the remedy of forfeiture, we 
submit that no proper exercise of the option to ac-
celerate was ever made by plaintiffs or if it was 
ever properly m·ade, it was waived or abandoned. 
The declared intention to accelerate contained in 
Exhibit P-4 was not followed by affirmative action 
toward enforcing the declared intention, but on the 
contrary was followed by action inconsistent with 
enforcing the declared intention. 
It should also be noted that the letter of Aug-
ust 17, 19'59, Exhibit P-4, is from Keith Sudbury 
only and is addressed to Ted Stevenson only. Keith 
Sudbury's wife owned a ten per cent interest in the 
partnership assets and was a party to the agree-
ment in question. Under the rule stated in 59 C.J.S. 
Sec. 495 (5) (d) * * * "Joint owners of a mortgage 
must join in an election" Sudbury's wife had to 
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join in the election to make it effective. Even if the 
court were to treat Exhibit P-4 as a valid exercise 
of the option so far as the language of it is con-
cerned, it would not be effective because both Sud-
bury and his wife did not join in the election to 
accelerate the payments. 
On September 1, 1959, and before any other af-
firmative act was taken by the Sudburys, a tender 
of all delinquent installments under the agreement 
was made to the Sudburys. As shown by Mr. Rey-
nolds' letter of September 11, 1959, Exhibit P-5, 
the installments so tendered were returned. 
On November 10, 1959, plaintiffs filed their 
complaint in this action and asked the court to for-
feit all of defendants' interests in the entire busi-
ness and assets covered by the agreement. The com-
plaint does not seek a foreclosure of the chattel 
mortgage. Motions for summary judgment were 
made by both p·arties and were argued on January 
20, 1960. Two days prior to the date of that argu-
ment and again on the date of that argument de-
fen·dants made a tender to plaintiffs of all install-
ments that had accrued down to those two dates. 
Since no effective exercise of the option to ac-
celerate the payme11ts l1ad been made as of Septem-
ber 1, 1959, and since none had been made as of 
January 18, and January 20, of 1960, under the 
holding of the Utah Supreme Court in Home Own-
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ers Loan Corporation v. Washington, supra, the 
tender of payment of the installments that were 
due under the contract cut off the right of the plain-
iffs to exercise the option to accelerate. That being 
true defendants are not in default under the agree-
ment in question. 
Defendants at this time stand ready, willing 
and able to pay plaintiffs all installments that are 
due under said agreement. Defendants would at this 
time deposit the installments that are due with the 
Clerk of this Court, if to do so would not be a use-
less act. The letter dated February 2·7, 1960, from 
Mr. Reynolds (R. 40) clearly demonstrates that 
plaintiffs will not accept the past due installments 
until this case is finally determined. 
P·OINT III 
FORECDOS'URE IS PLAINTIFFS' EXCLUSIVE 
REMEDY UNDER THE AGREEMENT IN QUESTION. 
The trial court has held that the agreement in 
question is in legal effect a chattel mortgage. The 
clear and convincing reasons for the trial court so 
holding are discussed at length under Point I. If 
the trial court was correct, as we think it clearly 
was, in the construction it placed on the agreement, 
the question then arises what are plaintiffs' rem-
edies under Utah law for the enforcement of a chat-
tel mortgage? 
Section 9-1-15 U.C.A., 1953, reads as follows. 
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Conditional Sales Excepted- conveyance in nature 
of mortgage included. 
"The provisions of this title shall not ap-
ply to contracts for the possession, use and 
conditional purchase of personal property con-
taining a condition that title shall not pass 
until full payment of the purchase price; but 
shall extend to and include all such bills of 
sale, deeds of trust and other conveyance of 
personal property as shall have the effect of 
a mortgage or lien upon such property." 
Section 9-1-5 U.C.A., 1953, provides that a 
chattel mortgage may be foreclosed in the manner 
provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages 
upon real property or that a chattel mortgage con-
taining a power of sale upon default being made 
in the terms or conditions thereof may be fore-
closed by advertisement in the manner provided 
in Title 9. 
Section 78-37-1 U.C.A., 195'3, provides, 
"There can be but one action for the re-
covery of any debt or the enforcement of any 
right secured by mortgage upon real estate 
or personal property, which action must be 
in accordance with the provisions of this chap-
ter. Judgment shall be given adjudging the 
amount due, with costs and disbursements, 
and the sale of the mortgaged property, or 
some part thereof to satisfy said amount and 
accruing costs, and directing the sheriff to 
proceed and sell the same according to the 
provisions of law relating to sales on execu-
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tion, and a special execution or order of sale 
shall be issued for that purpose." 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Morgan 
v. Layton, 60 U. 280, 208 ·p. 50'5, held that the re-
medy by foreclosure prescribed by Section 9-1-5 
U.C.A., 1953, is the only one in this jurisdiction to 
which a creditor can resort in order to enforce his 
lien, unless the mortgage contains a power of sale 
as provided in Title 9. If the mortgage does contain 
a power of sale, Section 9-1-7 U.C.A., 1953, pro-
vides the method of advertisement. Section 9-1-9 
prescribes the manner of sale, and section 9-1-12 
provides that the money realized from the sale shall 
be used first to pay the costs and expenses of fore-
closure and second the amount of the mortgage debt 
and third the balance is to be paid to the owner of 
the mortgaged property. 
The statute prescribes the sole remedy for the 
enforcement of a chattel mortgage. The public policy 
of the State of Utah as declared by our legislature 
and as restated by our Supreme Court in the Layton 
case states there is but two ways to foreclose a chat-
tel mortg~ge, one by advertisement if a power of 
sale is contained in the mortgage or by an action 
in court to foreclose. In either event the statute is 
mandatory that after the costs of foreclosure and 
the mortgage debt are paid the balance must be paid 
to the mortgagor. Any agreement of the parties to 
the contrary to the effect that the plaintiffs would 
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have the right to sell all of the property covered by 
the agreement and to retain all of the money real-
ized from said sale, is in effect strict foreclosure 
and is unenforceable because against the public 
policy of this state as declared by our legislature. 
Section 9-1-15 U.C.A., 1953, quoted above makes 
it clear cut that Title 9 does not apply to conditional 
sales contracts but that it does apply with full force 
to any instrument no matter what its form that 
is in legal effect a chattel mortgage. Since the agree-
ment in question is in legal effect a chattel mort-
gage, the provisions of Paragraph VI A and VI B 
would be and are unenforceable because only the 
remedies prescribed by Title 9 U.C.A., 1953, are 
available to the owner of a chattel mortgage. 
P·OINT IV 
ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF. 
Plaintiffs in their brief have failed to cite one 
case or any authority or give one reason why the trial 
court's construction of the agreement and its hold-
ing that it in legal effect was a chattel mortgage is 
erroneous. It seems to us that is the first and most 
fundamental question involved in this case. Until 
the legal effect of the agreement has been deter-
mined, it is impossible to define the rights of the 
parties. Once the agreement has been construed 
and it has been decided whether in legal effect it 
is a chattel mortgage or a conditional sales contract, 
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then the remedies that are available to plaintiffs 
in the event of default can be spelled out. Until the 
agreement is construed and until its legal effect 
is determined, the court has no basis for determin-
ing what remedies are available nor has it any basis 
for determining whether or not there was a default 
on the part of the defendants or whether or not 
that default may have been cured. If the legal effect 
of the agreement is that of a chattel mortgage, then 
it is clear that notwithstanding any agreements of 
the parties to the contrary, the plaintiffs' remedy 
is to foreclose in accordance with the statute. If 
the legal effect of the agreement were determined 
to be a conditional sales contract, then we would 
have to look to the law governing the remedies un-
der conditional sales contracts to determine what 
remedies are available to plaintiffs. In general if 
a buyer defaults under a conditional sales contract 
the seller has an election to sue for the balance due 
under the contract or if the contract so provides, 
he has the right to retain the amounts already paid 
as liquidated damages and to retake possession of 
the property. This latter remedy is available unless 
the retaking possession of the property and reten-
tion of the amounts paid amounts to a penalty and 
would therefore be unenforceable. 
Plaintiffs main attack on the ruling of the 
trial court is to the effect that the trial court has 
28 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
rewritten the contract. Plaintiffs' argument in that 
regard is completely without basis. The trial court 
has not rewritten any contract. All the trial court 
has done is to construe the existing agreement. It 
has determined that in legal effect it is a chattel 
mortgage and not a conditional sales contract. Once 
that determination has been made the remedies and 
the rights of the parties follow in accordance with 
the rules of law pertaining to chattel mortgages. 
If one of those rules is that the only remedy avail-
able to a mortgagee under a chattel mortgage in the 
event of default is to foreclose in accordance with 
the statute, notwithstanding agreements of the party 
to the contrary, the court is bound by that rule of law 
and must follow it as the trial court did in this case. 
The plaintiffs in their attack on the trial court 
for so called "rewriting the contract" bases most 
of their criticism on the idea that plaintiffs were 
only able to satisfy the balance due under the con-
tract out of the property sold and that plaintiffs 
could not get a personal judgment against defen-
dants. The thing that plaintiffs overlook is that the 
defendants paid the sum of $10,791:59 of the pur-
chase price at the time of the execution of the con-
tract. As security for the payment of the balance 
of $25,408.41, defendants not only gave plaintiffs 
a chattel mortgage on the property purchased from 
plaintiffs but also gave plaintiffs a chattel mort-
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gage on the one-half interest owned by defendants 
which presumably was worth the sum of $36,200.00 
the same as the plaintiffs one-half interest was 
worth. We do not think this has anything to do 
with the case, but we do want to avoid any erron-
eous impression being made that plaintiffs were not 
adequately secured. 
Again we call the courts attention to the fact 
that defendants stand ready, willing and able at any 
time to pay all past due installments to plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSION 
'1'he defendants positio11 in this case is as fol-
lows: 
1. The trial court was correct in holding that 
the agreement in question was in legal effect a chat-
tel mortgage, and this is so because: 
a. Paragraph II of the agreement pro-
vides, "That sellers shall and hereby do convey to 
buyers an undivided one-half interest in and to cer-
tain described property". 
b. Title passed to the defendants at the 
time said agreement was executed. 
c. Defendants prior to the execution of 
the agreement had title to a one-half interest in the 
property sold under said agreement. 
d. Paragraph V and VI of the agreement 
clearly indicate the intention of the parties that 
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plaintiffs are to acquire a security interest in the 
property sold and also in the property owned by the 
defendants prior to the execution of the agreement. 
This could only be done by a chattel mortgage. 
e. A necessary element of a conditional 
sales contract is that the seller retain title as se-
curity for the payment of the purchase price. If 
title passes by the terms of the agreement, there is 
only one way to give the seller a security interest 
in the property sold, and that is by ·chattel mortgage. 
2. Plaintiffs did not accelerate and declare 
due all of the installments under the agreement. 
a. The letter of August 1'7, 1959, Exhi-
bit P-4, is equivocal and states that the remedy of 
foreclosure or the remedy of forfeiture and taking 
over the business may be pursued. Acceleration goes 
only with foreclosure. It has nothing to do with 
forfeiture. 
b. Only one of the plaintiffs signed the 
letter of August 17, 1959. It was not signed by both 
plaintiffs. It was addressed to only one of the de-
fendants. It should have been addressed to both de-
fendants to constitute a valid exercise of the option 
to accelerate. Plaintiffs being joint owners of the 
mortgage had to join in exercising the option to 
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3. A tender of all unpaid installments was 
made by defendants on September 1, 195'9, and was 
refused by the plaintiffs. 
a. If the August 17, 1959, letter could 
be construed as a declaration of intention to accel-
erate the payments, the actions of the plaintiffs 
thereafter were 'Clearly inconsistent with exer-
cising the option to accelerate and foreclosing a 
mortgage. A mere declaration of intention to accel-
erate is not sufficient but to be effective as stated 
by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Union Central 
Life Insurance Company v. Adams, 169 ·Okla. 572, 
3'8 P. 2d 2'6, 
"The declaration must be followed by 
an affirmative act towards enforcing the de-
clared intention." 
The letter of September 11, 1959, Exhibit 
P-5, from plaintiffs' attorney clearly abandons the 
remedy of foreclosure which is the only remedy that 
would have to be preceded by an exercise of the 
option to accelerate. 
b. The filing of the complaint on the 
theory of a forfeiture and not on the theory of a 
foreclosure was clearly an act inconsistent with 
enforcing the declared intention contained in the 
letter of August 17, 1959, to accelerate the pay-
ment and hence was either a waiver or abandon-
ment of such declared intention or rendered the dec-
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laration to accelerate ineffective because such dec-
laration was not followed by an act toward enforc-
ing the declared intention but was followed by an 
act clearly inconsistent with such declared inten-
tion. 
4. The tender made by defendants on Sep-
tember 1, 1959, January 18, 1960, and January 
20, 1960, of the sums due under the contract were 
made before an effective election to accelerate and 
therefore bars acceleration of the entire debt. 
5. Since the agreement is in legal effect a 
chattel mortgage, the only remedy ·available to plain-
tiffs in the event of default was to accelerate the 
payments and to foreclose the chattel mortgage in 
accordance with the statute. The provisions of the 
agreement for a strict foreclosure contrary to the 
statute and the provisions of the agreement for a 
forfeiture contrary to the remedy provided by sta-
tute are unenforceable. 
6. If the judgment is ·affirmed, the plaintiffs 
will still get their money with interest and justice 
will have been done between the parties. 
The judgment of the trial court should be af-
firmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McBROOlVI & HANNI 
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